Amoral Culture of Neurophilosophy; An Eliminativist Perspective

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Abstract

Every dominant ideology signifies a culture with a specific context in order to form a distinct social culture. Similarly, eliminative materialism also signifies scientific context. If it prevails and considers the preferences of individuals in their lived experiences, it will foster a sense of culture for community, as the ideological account validation of eliminativists. Eliminativism significantly emphasizes scientific descriptions of human behavior and materializes common sense elimination. Consequently, this prompts an inquiry into the problem of freewill, which raises moral obligation. Eliminativists are causally determined, this calls into question the concept of moral responsibility. It manifests that individuals are morally accountable for their conduct or maybe not. Consequently, eliminativist culture demonstrates amoral grounds, on which this paper stands.

Keywords*:* Eliminativism, Amorality, Responsibility, Neuroculture, Neuromorality

Introduction

The subscription of the neurophilosophy centers around issues of neuroscience and turning way of thinking (Solymosi, & Shook, 2014). The advancement of neuroscience elaborates a human is gene-coded and eco-territorial bound to act. But free actions are natural (Deery. 2021) or biological (Hadley, 2008) interactions with the environment. Humans behave not only because of their nature but also, more specifically, because of their culture (Nguyen, Le, & Vuong, 2023). Our perception and way of thinking about the world is a cultural construct, even our self is a social construct (Gergen, 2011), not an illusion (Habermas 2004). A culture is an integrated pattern that transfers knowledge to succeeding generations and gives the ability to learn how to 'execute their actions (Paul Churchland, 1992)'. Neurophilosophers, such as Paul and Patricia Churchland lay the foundations for the constitution of neuroculture. A culture encompasses human knowledge, values, beliefs, behaviors, customs, language, ideas, codes, institutions, heritage, rituals, and creative expression that constitute the understanding of who we are and what we do (Ronchi, 2009).

Neuroculture involves neurophilosophical narratives of human beings (Lynch, & Laursen, 2009). This insight changes the human perception from mind to the brain. One of the key tenets of many neuroscientific perspectives on the mind is what brains do (Minsky, 1988). The assumption is that consciousness, freewill, and other mental states and activities can be completely explained in terms of neurophysiological processes and functional neuroanatomical structures. These neurological processes are incorporated appropriately physiologically instead of epistemological or metaphysical. All this rejects conventional philosophical and epistemological explanations of mental phenomena and comprehends the mind in terms of brain functions. This narrative considers the mind to be an emergent characteristic (Sperry, 1980) of the brain rather than a distinct thing or

substance. Further, it indicates that rather than being brought about by some sort of non-physical force or entity, the mind, and its attributes result from the complex interactions of neurons and their connections. Therefore, a scientific phenomenon should be explicable by rigorous, deterministic scientific laws and theories (Hempel, 1965). The deterministic postulation is a development where things occur by the preceding events. Truly free choices are not caused by anything, or at least nothing physical, such as brain activity (Patricia Churchland, 2013).

A person can be aware of or foresee with conviction what he will do at a specific event soon. So, he can't be aware or foresee with certainty. This frustrates the possibility of freewill of an individual that he should rest assured about his decisions or be dubious of their outcome. Yet, a person might have specific goals and endeavors. He should concede that his activities are equitably brought about by reasons. Those are unchangeable as far as the person might be concerned. Humans are responsible for their actions. To see this, just imagine a person taking food in his lucid dream. Even though we realize that in this condition one is dozing on the bed, and certainly not on the eating table. A person's food choices and odors (Mors. et al., 2018; Andersson, et al. 2021) tell the physical mechanisms of the necessities of the brain's neuronal circuits, and the brain carefully transfers the guidance to the neurons as prerequisites. It means that the physical body follows the brain, rather than a subject-object conventional relation to bring about the manifestation of the freewill.

The abandonment of freewill raises concerns regarding a person's moral responsibility, specifically whether their actions are free or not. Because culture is a format where a person can exercise their rights, such as freedom of speech or to express emotions. The concept of the freewill has forever been moral. In any case, is it an ethical inquiry question for eliminativists? It is a challenge for

eliminativists to address the problem of freewill. A determined person and a free human are two distinct characteristics. It establishes a clear line between man and machine, particularly when decision-making processes (Nisbett, and Wilson, 1977). More clearly, it is a shift toward biological determinism (Tancredi, 2007).

Patricia Churchland (2002) as an eliminativist, views it as a control mechanism of human exercise. In her assessment, an unintentional act of hitting somebody is an *out-of-control* event that occurred. Though, the occurrence of this event is a physical portrayal, rather than a choice in accordance to a person's desire. Present circumstances include that it would not have been chosen under any case. In this manner, determinism contradicts free decisions that require an honest conviction. The result of neuroculture is the understanding of how culture influences the brain further, and moreover, it seeks to grasp ethical implications for society and culture. This explains the manner in which people perceive the events, as well as the cognitive processes they employ to make decisions. It's a pattern of culture and social activity that shapes the neurobiology of the brain (Choudhury, Suparna. & Slaby, 2016). It is a neurological process that assists our understanding of actions, wishes, desires, emotions (Rolls, 2005), sense of style, and other aspects of human behavior. For instance, if we love a piece of art, there may be a way for cognition to directly affect the pleasure we derive from it. The implication is to enhance subjective pleasure by rewarding aesthetic stimuli. Of course, cognition can increase enjoyment in other ways, for as by learning how to employ the different facets of music to enhance the qualities of the reward stimuli. The better we can create enhanced emotional feelings of pleasure, the more we may be able to comprehend how our brains function (Rolls, 2012).

The more we understand the neurological implications of our actions and decisions, the freer we are. In this context, Benjamin Libet's stance as an American brain physiologist demonstrated that the brain develops a neuronal "*readiness potential*" that is thought to occur 350–400 milliseconds prior to the subjectively experienced intention to act (e.g. while raising the arm). Human actions are physical, and their decisions are neural activity (Libet et al. 1983). The manifestation of physical events is regulated by fundamental laws of physics. Physical events, in turn, are the result of cerebral occurrences (or brain events), such as rising hands, cravings, pain, and blinking.

The concept seems to suggest that if the causes of our intended activities are unreflective, then our intended action lacks freedom (Mele, 2013). On the other side, Libet's investigations of unreflective intentions might be completely compatible with free will (Byrd, 2021). According to the contra-causal accounts of freewill, decisions are made free of causal antecedents. It means, our will generates a rational decision. Since the whole, to some extent, affects the contributions that its individual components make. By and large, this process occurs in a manner, in which one thing initiates a causal chain, to generate another cause, that contributes to the occurrence of an event. Causality works, even in far-off cases. Likewise, one needs self-assurance to perceive freedom that can depict the idea of a person as a man. Wegner (2002) makes a distinction to describe conscious will. For him, it is a notion of volition, or engaging in a deliberate action, just as we attribute causality to events in different domains. We eventually evolve to attach causality to our thought processes.

If causes are events, whereas reasons are not, events and causes are not the same (Searle, 2003). There is an event or flow of events without pause from a causal nexus. It is based on the principle of causality, where one event leads to the next, occurring in a consistent and perpetual manner. A

connection exists between the two events, although their relationship is not static. Nothing happens at random; everything happens out of reason and by necessity (Freeman, 1983). The two things, at a similar space and time, cause one another. The candle is lightened by the combustion of fire that illuminated the room. It shows that Cause-A consistently comes before Cause-B and there is no discernible alternative cause. The occurrence of the thought must precede the execution of the action and must align for apparent mental causation. Thus, the unintentional act involves the contraction and relaxation of muscles within a few hundred milliseconds. This particular configuration of brain neuronal circuitry serves to validate the predictability. Natural determinism governs the nerve cells of the brain, and past events can be predicted (Popper, 1988).

Newtonian physics postulates natural laws, it is imperative to exert an external force upon an object for an event to occur. This implies causality and qualifies the causal (or natural) determinism (Paul and Patricia Churchland, 1981). This tells us that there is only one possibility to explain future actions or events, all are the result of past events (Addis, et al. 2010). To some extent, all cultures share an understanding of causal determinism. Though, predictability and determinism both have a contrary association. That association determines the occurrence of each event in an anticipatory manner, whereas human actions lack this. Human actions are contra predictive mechanisms (Scriven, 1964). If a person knows before that action. That would be contrary to its prediction. Nonetheless, contrary acts can cause predictability. Hence announcing predictability is a contrapredictive mechanism. It means, choosing not to predict action and acting otherwise. Neurological complications identify such contrapredictive mechanisms. This controlled mechanism follows deterministic laws. They work in a precise and efficient way to perform actions and explain their action. Considering causal determinism would be an accomplishment besides chaos theory, inherent in primitive human culture (Sellars, 1956).

There is no option, an event occurs before any deliberate events. Though intentional activity has not occurred before by deliberate decisions (Keller, et al. and Hehman, et al. 2015). Unintentional activity develops slowly, and the cerebrum works in this way. Thus, determinism is viable here. The constraints on human actions are a reflection of human freedom. 'So, everything we know about physics forces us to some form of denial of human freedom' (Searle, 1984). The causal determinist premise is true (Davies, 1980), if so, is freewill even possible? Determinism, according to compatibilists, may very well be true, but it is erroneous to think that it precludes free will. Libertarians assert that determinism and freewill are irreconcilable, yet determinism is not always true. The issue of eliminativism and freewill is a fascinating riddle for ethicists.

All the above, determinism brings an opportunity to prolong the eliminativists' cultural design. It appears to be that eliminativists talk about all living beings, i.e., humans and animals. It is very close to defining the present human, a moral entity that decides his fate. They can carry on with a day-to-day existence free of outer interruptions by others. They have ethical rights for self-assurance. It is good to make different significant inquiries. This questions the ethical spirit of the eliminativists' way of life. Regardless of whether the subjects of eliminativists' general public need responsibility. Eliminativists objectify the ethical codes of a being and its beingness (Paul Churchland, 1992). Our ethical practices are not simply built but rather just decide current realities about the world and inquiries.

Amorality

Neuromorality is the way to understand the brain functions for the process of decision-making, reasoning, and solving problems. It describes the behavior of humans in the context of their interactions with other humans. It also works at the neural connections between our brains and our

bodies. It explores the brain, its structure, function, development, injury, and behavior. This field includes many subdisciplines, including neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, neurochemistry, molecular biology, genetics, virology, etc. It is a new way of thinking about how to be ethical. This is changing everything from the way we treat each other. One can see its impact on social media, how they are constantly processing information and making decisions to understand what makes people suggest opinions or simply tick to do grocery shopping (neuroeconomics). Neuroscientifically, a person is a controlled freak, and he could be hallucinatory, or illusive (Bassiony, et. al 2000).

Traumatic condition implies that neuronal correlations are not working. And being sick, or in pain, obscures the person's approach to his/her real image of his or her activity during the *neuroimaging* process. That action can damage the future image with distorted reality. In illusions, one simply fantasizes without having a genuine image of reality. Their insight is voluntarily fixed to his/her image. Besides, if there is a state of compulsion, the person picks the best image from among his/her existing image in their memory. Criminologists suggest, because of the criminal history (Englich, and Soder, 2009), a person commits a crime. Also, the mild nostalgic condition is observed in their behaviors. Really it is hard to dispose of the memory. Memory is a warehouse that shows reluctance to their acts. For a person to behave unusually in this sense, about a particular illicit act. This precludes the person from criminal acts. He may be oblivious to his behaviors (Gazzaniga, 2005) from a defect reason to such an extent. We incur discipline as indicated by the person's deliberate bad behavior. Whenever we punish infants for breaking toys or tossing glass pots, and many others. We regret that we are wrong in our unethical behavior towards them. Since they can’t manage or have less sense of their physical motor sense. Though they haven't any malevolence for us.

One who figures out his/her unusual condition is a noteworthy perspective to that person. For an individual of such stature, there exist conditions in which that person may qualify for a pardon based on certain justification (Moore,1992). In such events, a person experiences an impulsive state and no resentment during the act because he has no control over it (Glasser, 1985). Then, at that point, an uncontrolled way of behaving is considered unethical or possibly so. In this instance, ethical status would be a matter of uncertainty in relation to the criminals' behavior. The solution to our desires, convictions, wants, fears, or expectations, lies solely in regulations. These regulations, however, possess a transient nature and lack resilience. Regardless, we express our social settings through intricate and complex interactions with nature. The extent of brain states veers off from the unique design of the relationship. To bring charges against an individual regardless of consent is straightforward. Several established rules or norms are being rendered feasible for human conduct. And they are effectively depicted to furnish evidence to blame the accused.

Assuming a person's acts pose a potential danger to another person, it can be inferred that he does not have any intention of causing harm. But his belief is that it is not injurious or somehow lesser. Finally, assuming there are states of obliviousness about the act, the person lacks knowledge of the consequences that will manifest. Anything in obliviousness a person fails to reflect any moral or unethical act. It would be an ignorant act to hold a person accountable for such acts, as asserted by a faulty man (Dawkins, 2006). A person who is accused becomes subject to liability and is deemed negligent for his acts. Further, let him enjoy freedom from engaging in voluntary acts. This sort of view renders the concept of freewill viable with determinism as perceived by compatibilists. Despite this, causality serves as the immediate representative of any given activity.

This phenomenon of causal determinism makes the person determined for any ethical obligation. Which holds significance and preeminent worth for individuals. It also separates people and other living creatures, animals, fishes, etc. (Searle, 2003). If a person's acts are involuntary. It posits that either he engages in this act or refrains from doing so (O'Connor, 2002). Engaging in either of two possibilities due to an unknown causal factor results in one's accountability. The concept of possessing *'either this or that'* or possessing something *'other than this or that'* though undergone evolutionary changes. And it has transformed a person into a proficient individual. The possession of 'this or that' or 'other than this or that' has become a learned behavior by others (predecessors). Here eliminativists' causal determinism discards every mental state and establishes brain states. Hence, the eliminativist culture is characterized by the absence of choice in determining the old social context, thus resulting in causal determinism.

Eliminativists' culture

The aforementioned discourse tells eliminativists to refute the folk psychological terminologies and determine causal-based values while placing great emphasis on scientific terminologies. Though it qualifies as a parsimonious way to identify justified truth belief (JTB). To perceive reality, different narrations of the truth will be transformed into a simple description. While individuals create a social fabric for the deterministic approach and cultural dynamism. Eliminativists streamline their doctrine for their governing body to present it. Their wishful commandments are to:

1. Eliminate the folk psychology (old conventions).

2. Embrace the scientific laws (new conventions).

These two commandments constitute the eliminativists' theory of state, which is characterized by a neuro-political shift in the culture. If we examine this very parsimonious neuro-political constitution. The first one imposes a restriction, prohibiting the agent from acting according to the Old Testament. Conversely, the second commandment pertains to scientific baptism. The aforementioned two eliminativistic commandments choose determinism as a moral consideration. If any individual, albeit reluctantly, obeys the first rule*, to eliminate folk psychology (old conventions),* then he possesses only choice to follow the second rule, *to embrace the scientific laws (new conventions).* At least in science, errors can be corrected by refuting the previous hypothesis to clarify the matter. Following the elimination of folk psychology due to its perceived flaws, eliminativism becomes amoral. By attaining clearance in these two levels, an individual will gain the status of a citizen of the eliminativist state.

These two rules serve as the code of conduct or a *Magna Carta* for the eliminativists' civilization. These biamorous laws, characterized by their parsimonious ideology and fixed nature, exert an extreme influence on human life. In the eliminativist world, an individual finds himself in an immaculate and pristine terrain. He is not deemed legitimate for his conduct nor held accountable. As nothing bad has happened, neither to him nor to others, there is not any infallible condition. This represents the eliminativistic version of freedom – freedom from accountability. Hence, in order to attain an infallible state, a person is exempt from being held accountable for any misconduct. There is no space for misconduct, as the adherence to Popperian principle of falsification (1963). consequently, there are no immoral acts present. This is due to the fact that, for the eliminativists, immoral acts are solely because of the prevailing folk psychology. In a precise way, there is a lack of legislative authority at all. It's rudimentary for eliminativists to posit that in the absence of folk psychology, there is a lack of any lawful acts. This asserts that certain

aspects of ethical inquiry within that society are beyond reproach. So, if the notion of *'not good'* doesn't exist in an eliminativist society would imply that the 'good' is no longer there. Contrarily, that society would naturally exhibit progression in a linear manner.

It can be stated that in an eliminativist state, nothing would be legal. Consequently, determinism eliminates the choice of good, or bad, or right, or wrong. In this scenario, eliminativists enjoy mutatis mutandis, which means an amoral regime replaces a traditional moralist one. Definitely question arises of what kind of a person would be if *amoralism* were established. A person who identifies himself as an amoralist is defined not by his behavior, but rather by his actions. Typically, an amoralist is a naysayer of traditional norms and values. Thence, in the eliminativistic regime, a person will be a nontraditionalist. He will be ethically free and socially profound, to their traditional counterparts (Small, 2020).

Conclusion

This inquiry pertains to the question of whether someone would be a human (Dennett, 1993) from an eliminativistic perspective. Most of the questions it raised are still open for scholars to decide its fate. Historically, it is evident that every scientific theory communicates its social attributes, including norms, values, and the likes. And becomes the main assembly for the existing social structure in order to shape or alter it. If a theory inductively succeeds in valuing neutrality and making scientific knowledge available for collective identity (Snow, 2001), then the practical application within society establishes a culture to deliver its framework. The outcome of this process results in a paradigm shift (Kuhn,1962/1970), to determine its progress or rejection. The Churchlands assert reality of the physical world can be affirmed through scientific means to

liberate themselves from the chains of the stale thoughts of the past. Its ramifications will acknowledge the neuroethical human or amoral human.

Despite this, every culture manages its qualities, and standards to keep its ethical stability. It has a composition of a set of rules that generates decisions and delivers a guideline for behaviors and actions to make a perception of the world. These rules are perceived as norms, which serve as criteria for ethical practice. Hence, rules are interwoven in the framework of language as signs to comprehend gestures, intentions, events, and so on. For Paul Churchland, language works as a tool, where 'grammatical and semantic differences appear to distinguish moral from factual' (Paul Churchland, 1992). Words and sentences are always part of larger texts, and texts, in turn, are integral to cultures that articulate diverse perspectives and those perspectives can clash within the same cultural sphere, creating a community that establishes competing worldviews (Johnson, 2020). For instance, if I go to the cinema with friends or any other activity that is part of a daily life as a fun. Critically examine that activity and one could ask, why it would be fun? Because a social group (friends) recommended it, and also it is an established norm that often people go to the cinema. Such situations and many others tell that behind scene, a culture gives us norms to interpret our actions and perform accordingly.

A human with specific skills like recalling memories, mindfulness, expectations, and comprehension could be familiar with his freedom, society's virtues, and critical thinking skills to decide. In this regard, freewill is a characteristic that plays an essential role in decision-making. It is the criterion for accountability or taking responsibility for one's actions. To explain in terms of moral responsibility, the bending of an arm or finger is a voluntary action. All voluntary actions express the freewill propositions in every culture. All that's freewill actions result in personal

freedom actualization. The nature of freewill is to detract the person from the decision-making exercise of *to-do* or *not-to-do* something. A person who knows and not-knows (Walsh, 1963), is in two states of action. As the deciding variables may not know about his activities. Do they really control their activities, or not? Do they truly understand what they are doing? Do they know (or not know), what is happening? Here 'knowing' and 'not knowing' recommends intentional stance varies (Dennett, 1987). Deliberately, one is disposing of the purposeful demonstration. The thing he is doing – is unexpectedly making haziness and disarray. That's why Hampshire (1982) is likewise giving human activity an intentional relation. This further involves the perplexing ramifications. As, our consciousness and understanding are affected by our nonsocial perception (Paul Churchland, 1992).

Humans have been observed to imitate what they learn from their surroundings. These surroundings eventually cause human limbs to become aware of their sensations. These sensations or their sensory receptors function in physical environments. These environmental factors give human imagination critical thoughts, geometry, bioscience, music, writing, and so forth.

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